Digests of Leading Law Review Articles by unknown
DIGESTS OF LEADING LAW
REVIEW ARTICLES
LIMITING JUDICIAL REVIEW BY ACT OF CONGRESS-Joseph L.
Lewinson. 23 California Law Review 591 (Sept., '935).
The numerous pronunciamentos concerning the desirability of a con-
stitutional amendment limiting the power of the Supreme Court make
this article timely and thought-provoking.
During the last five months of its recent term the Supreme Court
declared unconstitutional four federal statutes and one Joint Resolution
of Congress. During the first seventy-five years of our national exist-
ence the court declared unconstitutional only two federal statutes.
What can Congress do to limit the power of judicial review? A
close inspection of Sections I and 2 of Article III of the Constitution
shows that the lower federal courts are created by Congress while the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is held subject to such ex-
ceptions and under such regulations as Congress shall make. Congress
has no power to limit the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
Federal statutes creating and abolishing inferior federal courts and
acts limiting their jurisdiction have been passed so often that such statutes
are now rarely questioned. The right to trial in an inferior court can
hardly be termed a constitutional right.
In 1796 the Supreme Court said that Congress must provide rules
to regulate appellate proceedings before it could exercise appellate juris-
diction. In deciding The Luckenbach Steamship Co. v. U.S., 272 U.S.
533 (1926), the court said "appellate review is not essential to the due
process of law but is a matter of grace." The Mc~ardle case (7 Wall.
5o6, i 9 L.Ed. 264) of 1868 strengthens the belief that Congress can
grant or deprive the court of the power of appellate review.
From the very words of the Supreme Court one can argue that
Congress may withhold jurisdiction to declare laws unconstitutional
without otherwise disturbing the jurisdiction. But can the federal courts
function as such without jurisdiction to declare national laws unconsti-
tutional? English courts don't attempt the reviewing power. Judicial
review in the United States was little used until 1883 nor is this
power expressly provided for in the Constitution. Marbury v. Madison,
I Cranch 137, 2 L.Ed. 6o, in 1803 gave Chief Justice Marshall an
opportunity to declare for judicial review. He failed to distinguish as he
could have between state and federal legislation. His doctrine really
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implies the supremacy of the federal judiciary instead of an equality with
the other branches of the government. Holmes admitted the court could
exist and function quite well without the reviewing power.
Congress can act to require the concurrence of more than a bare
majority of justices when declaring on the constitutionality of a law.
Questions of constitutionality usually arise under the court's appellate
jurisdiction. Therefore Congress would be within its right in regulating
the appellate power. The members of Congress and the chief executive
have also sworn to support the Constitution. If four members of the
court also believe the statute is constitutional why should the bare ma-
jority be empowered to say that such measure is unconstitutional beyond
all reasonable doubt? Such a question seems to be political and therefore
subject to action of Congress free from the court's power to review.
The question to be left with every thinking lawyer and layman is
this: Do we want to control the free will of the people by judicial au-
thority or are we willing to trust the free will and a free people to work
out their own salvation? Statesmen, politicians, publicists will do well to
study possibilities of action under Article III, Sections I and 2 before
such ponderous utterances as "without a constitutional amendment we
are back in the horse and buggy days."
THE CHALLENGE OF A NEW FEDERAL PROCEDURE-Charles
E. Clarke, 2o Cornell Law Quarterly 443 (June, 1935).
In a previous article (44 Yale Law Journal, 307) the author has
reviewed the historical background of procedural reform in the federal
courts and described the act conferring upon the Supreme Court the
power to makes rules in actions at law and to unite federal law and
equity procedure.
This article again reviews the historical advancement of procedure.
Procedural rules have often been injurious to substantive legal rights.
Judicial power to make new rules should correct this failing of the
former procedural rules. In the recent past the Supreme Court declared
that the difference between law and equity couldn't be ignored. And
this declaration in spite of the attempt of the code reformers to combine
the systems of law and equity.
After many disappointments the act allowing rule-making by the
Supreme Court passed in June, 1934. (28 U.S.C.A., 723 b, 723 c.)
Now the Supreme Court can approve some of the many suggestions
offered by the bar in the various federal districts. It is to be hoped
that the proposed rules will be sympathetic to the real meaning of the
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bill. A half-hearted renovation may result in a backward movement,
imposing another system over the vestiges of several former systems
without obliterating them.
The court may make either a partial or complete reform--promul-
gate rules for law actions or issue rules uniting the systems of law and
equity. If the complete reform is made the other procedural systems
will be wiped out and many difficulties now confronting the federal
court practitioner will be obviated. The Federal Equity Rules with
slight changes can be made applicable to all actions by merely extending
their operations. The rule as to joinder of parties is especially satisfactory.
Three new sections are needed: (I) allowing a single civil action
and pleading of all matters whether legal or equitable in a single suit,
(2) providing for jury trial as of right in cases covered by the con-
stitutional requirement, (3) providing waiver of jury by failure to make
affirmative claim therefor within a certain period.
Rule making by courts is an administrative reform sadly needed in
the general field of procedure. The courts possess expert skill at making
rules far better than an indifferent legislature but they need a strong
stimulus to keep the rules abreast of the times. The Chief Justice plans
to go ahead with the major reform of combining the systems of law and
equity. The results will demonstrate the success or failure of rule mak-
ing by the courts.
TRANSCENDENTAL NONSENSE AND THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH
-Felix S. Cohen, 35 Columbia Law Review 8o9 (June,
1935).
The author, surveying the field of law, tells us in unmistakable terms
just what is wrong with our juristic philosophy. The argument of the
medieval classicists as to how many angels could dance on the point of a
needle seems to have frequent parallels in the circular reasoning of the
bench and bar. Even the liberal Cardozo stays too close to accepted
legal logic at times.
The abstract approach to legal questions is illustrated in the legal
questions: where is a corporation, when is a corporation, how high is
"fair" value, when is legal process "due"? The lawyers in answering
these questions use other terms such as "property rights," "corporate
entity," "title," "contract," "malice,' etc. The revolving wheel of
legal definition dare not go beyond the bounds of legal terms else the
definitions would have substantial meaning. At present they represent
legal nonsense in the highest form with legal concepts, rules of law, and
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systems of jurisprudence being the developments of an abstract science
of transcendental nonsense.
The traditional method leaves the lawyer in a maze of "mechanical
jurisprudence' and legal magic which he can dissolve only by a strong
wash of "cynical acid." Eradicate meaningless concepts that have no
equivalent in actual experience, forget meaningless questions and re-
define our legal concepts in empiric terms. "A thing is what it does"
should be a test. Let us redirect our research towards discovering the
significance of legal decisions. We must integrate the social sciences
with the study of law in order to assist us in appraising in ethical terms
the social values at stake in any choice between two precedents.
The functional approach can be used to redefine law in the terms
of what courts say and do. Law isn't necessarily what is ethically right
but it is what the state can command because it has the power. Like-
wise the realistic judge in administering the power of the state should
frankly assess the human values and appraise the social importance of the
precedents. The functional method of legal inquiry must go further
than the "hunch" theory of law. What the judge ate for dinner dims
in importance when we consider the judge's social heredity and present
environment. The old school feels the judge hands down an impartial
decision but careful research will show that his background is an impor-
tant factor in the decision.
To the lawyer interested in more than pure law, legal criticism must
have an objective description of the causes and consequences of legal
decisions. Then and only then can we correctly appraise law and legal
institutions in the light of human values.
ON WHAT IS WRONG WITH SO-CALLED LEGAL EDUCATION-
Karl N. Llewellyn, 35 Columbia Law Review 651 (May,
1935).
The writer feels that legal education is open to the criticisms which
are aimed at other fields of educational activity. Three Eastern law
schools, Columbia, Yale and Harvard furnish the basis for his arguments
and conclusions. Other law colleges are not worth considering. Legal
training lacks variety; its objectives and methods are the products of
historical conditioning and chance. The schools so far have failed to
prepare for better law. They fail to know what type of lawyers are
most in demand. Too much of legal preparation is from the judicial
,standpoint although relatively few men will become judges. In spite
of the excuse of the limited time law schools can do much more than
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now. If the law school teacher will trade places with the art school
teacher for a day he will discover many things about his ability to capture
and maintain interest. The maxim "the law is a jealous mistress" has
been carried too far. The artistic and the ;ocial fields can be combined
with the legal. Training in legislative and administrative fields should
be afforded as the political field is one place in which many lawyers
engage.
The times with their change of legal decisions press upon the poor
law school teacher. The student clamors for a vitalized curriculum. A
change is possible-what direction will it take?
Many are the defenses against change but they fall upon critical
examination--eliminate wasteful teaching, reorganize courses, use dif-
ferent technique for advanced students. The improvements will give
time for the student to integrate the law and other fields. Careful
authors can introduce materials into their case books which will lead
the students into a study of why is the law. Legal rules can then be
sized up in the light of their operation. Legal techniques-use of law
library, drafting, counselling, form study, practice court, apprenticeship
either interstitial or post-graduate--have a definite place in a law school.
The task of urging the traditional law school forward to cope with
the present is a twenty-year task calling for awakened students, a fac-
ulty of earnest and critical professors who are willing to put background
and teaching skill into their jobs, and a bar willing to teach and appren-
tice. With the widening of techniques will come a law school worthy
of the name.
THE PROBLEM OF THE SOURCES OF POSITIVE LAw-Giorgio
Del Vecchio, 47 Juridical Review 253 (September, 1935).
The author, a noted Italian jurist and philosopher, outlines the
philosophical concepts of law which prevail in Continental Europe. These
concepts must be considered by the student of Anglo-Saxon law if he
is to analyze and compare the underlying distinctions between legal
systems.
Law in its essential elements is human nature; human nature in the
mass with the reciprocal connections of obligation and claim is the
foundation of law. The absolute ideal of law-justice--can only be
approached and positive juridical orders are only imperfectly translated.
Such is the case when the jurist makes the law meet the facts in a
hard case.
The preponderant social will is determined by the clash and fric-
DIGESTS OF ARTICLES 95
tion of consciences each interpreting its own ideas of justice. From the
coordination of one human subject with another comes a juridical order
or a f9 rm of human society. The rules of social life can be called
the "sources of law."
The modes of manifestation of the preponderant social wil are:
custom, jurisdiction, and legislation. Custom arises by means of a series
of interferences springing from the productivity of single individual
consciences. When these customs become too numerous and complex
someone classifies and applies the customs thus exercising jurisdiction.
The judge or arbiter accelerates the historical growth of law. When
custom becomes too complicated for the arbiter the third stage, legisla-
tion, develops. The entire social community is represented by a special
organ which formulates imperative rules. This is the highest degree of
the formation of positive law.
These three sources all spring from the human spirit. Can legislation
keep pace with the needs of an ever expanding society? The legislative
organ in its highest development only utters or slightly modifies the
feeling of the human spirit. A law against the public conscience is
effectively abrogated although it may not be formally repealed.
The judge is restrained by the law to certain limits. Within those
bounds he has a wide range of judicial discretion so that he can decide in
accord with the demands of an expanding social life.
From our own nature we can extract an absolute and universally
valid criterion of the just and unjust; from this we can develop an
entire system of law. The human spirit in its universal nature will
always remain the first source of positive or natural law.
